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FAMILY GOVERNANCE SIGNALS AND HETEROGENEOUS PREFERENCES OF 
INVESTORS 
ABSTRACT 
We explore if investors use signals of founding family governance (ownership, involvement in 
management, board representation) when making investment choices in an experimental 
setting. We link the literature on heterogeneous preferences of investors to signalling theory, 
and apply it in the context of founding family governance by exploring the presence of investor 
clusters with varying utility functions with respect to founding family governance. We show 
that nonprofessional investors use these signals in their investment choices. Latent class 
analysis identifies three distinct clusters within our sample that have conflicting utility curves 
with respect to founding family governance. 





Families control a majority of public and private firms in the world (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer [1999]), and the corporate governance literature explores how family 
governance impacts performance and firm value. This research focuses on the aggregate market 
level outcomes in the form of a relationship between family control and Tobin’s q or price-to-
book values (for example Anderson and Reeb [2003] and Villalonga and Amit [2006] who 
explored the issue in the U.S.; and Maury [2006] in Europe). However, these aggregate market 
values are the joint product of any potential wealth enhancing effect a family may have and 
how investors react to information about the family’s involvement in the firm. Furthermore we 
know from the behavioural finance literature that individual investors employ a number of 
heuristics in their decision making such as company affect that may impact individual decision-
making (Aspara and Tikkanen [2010], [2011]). 
 Studying aggregate market values of family firms ignores these underlying behavioural 
issues as only the outcome of these processes are observed, rather than the decisions 
themselves. We do not know how individual investors use signals of family governance when 
making investment decisions. Moreover, these individuals may not have uniform heuristics 
processes and may thus not interpret information in a similar fashion (Bailey, Kumar, and Ng 
[2011]). The behavioural finance literature challenges traditional assumptions and suggests that 
investors are not necessarily fully rational, nor unbiased, and may act on information signals 
differently. There may be significant clusters of investors with positive or negative bias towards 
family firms. These biases are distinct from the actual impact the family has upon the firm, as 
the bias is part of the cognition of individual investors. Overall, we still have very little 
knowledge with respect to the way investors interpret and use signals related to founding family 
governance, and if this information influences their investment choices.  
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We address this gap in the research and explore if investors use signals of founding 
family governance (ownership, involvement in management, board representation) when 
making investment choices. As founding family governance may enhance or diminish 
shareholder wealth, we posit that investors will use these signals when choosing a firm to invest 
in. Furthermore, we respond to calls in research (Carcello, Hermanson, and Ye [2011]), and 
use an experimental approach in testing our hypotheses to provide causal evidence on the issue. 
Our study provides three primary contributions. First, we link signalling theory to 
founding family governance, to provide an explanation for why market values may be impacted 
by founding family governance. Prior work has primarily considered the actions of family 
owners and their effect on firm values. However, firm values are also influenced by the choices 
of investors, and how they interpret signals in the marketplace. To this end, we focus on the 
choices of investors in our study.  Second, we use an experimental approach in our study and 
provide causal evidence on the signalling effect of founding family governance. Researchers 
have to date largely used archival data in exploring the outcomes of family governance 
(Anderson and Reeb [2003], Villalonga and Amit [2006]). However, this limits the research 
community to making correlational claims with respect to any effect. Third, we link the 
literature on heterogeneous preferences of investors to signalling theory, and apply it in the 
context of founding family governance by exploring the presence of clusters of investors with 
varying utility functions with respect to founding family governance.  
We structure our paper as follows. In the hypothesis development, we review the 
peculiarities of family governance, and use signalling theory, and agency theory in 
hypothesizing its effect upon investor decision-making. In the method section, we describe the 
experiments that we use to test our hypotheses. We then present our results, with a focus upon 
analysing the heterogeneous preferences of investors. Finally, we discuss our findings in light 




of our hypotheses and the prior research, and conclude by identifying avenues for further 
research.  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Founding Family Ownership 
The majority of corporate governance research focuses on publicly listed firms. Recently, 
researchers have started to accept the notion that these publicly listed firms are diverse in 
nature, and that a significant portion of these firms are controlled by the founding family 
(Bhaumik and Gregoriou [2009]). Family firms are the most predominant business structure in 
the world (La Porta et al. [1999]), as roughly 65% to 80% of the world businesses can be 
deemed as family firms. Additionally, there is a common misconception that these firms are 
small and thus insignificant to the economy. However, family firms contribute 45% to 70% to 
a country’s GDP (Astrachan and Shanker [2003]). Furthermore, roughly a third of all publically 
listed firms in the world are family firms (Anderson and Reeb [2003], Maury [2006], Sraer and 
Thesmar [2007]). These factors together establish the prevalence and the significance of family 
firms in the economy.  
Prior research has suggested that family firms differ significantly from non-family 
firms, both in terms of managerial practices and financial performance (Anderson and Reeb 
[2003], Miller and Le Breton-Miller [2005], Villalonga and Amit [2006]). The most notable 
difference is the long-term orientation of the family firm. Family firms are managed with future 
generations in mind, resulting in a decrease in myopic behaviour (James [1999]). Families 
manage the family wealth through time for the benefit of future generations and in many cases 
this means managing the family firm through time as the vessel containing and growing the 
family wealth (James [1999]). However, the focus on the family and its future wealth benefits 
can also lead to detrimental effects for minority shareholders if the family uses their ability to 




control the firm for personal gain (Wang [2006]).  
 The evidence from the family business literature is grounded in the asset-pricing 
literature, which focuses on aggregate market values. However, it is important to understand 
the preferences of individuals in order to understand these aggregate market values. Recent 
behavioural finance research argues that aggregate asset prices may not be indicative of 
individual behaviour in markets (Blackburn and Ukhov [2013]). Further adding to the problem 
is the widespread use of archival capital markets data by the family firm literature, 
understanding market behaviour of individuals is quite difficult without detailed information 
about market participants and their decisions on an individual level (Coval and Shumway 
[2005]). Meaningful conclusions about the underlying behaviour are not possible through 
aggregate data. For example, while the aggregate effect of family governance upon market 
value may be observed as small or null, the underlying individuals may have strong preferences 
for or against family governance. 
Founding Family Governance Signals to Investors 
Investors have access to a variety of information, which they process and use when making 
investment choices (Nagy and Obenberger [1994]). While there exists information asymmetry 
between insiders and outside investors, this asymmetry can be reduced by signalling and 
increasing the information flow (Hughes [1986]). Within the specific context of family firms, 
these information asymmetries may be of greater importance as investors may perceive the 
agency risks to be elevated for these firms (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, and Buchholtz [2001]). 
Prior work on signalling theory has not considered founding family governance as a potential 
signal. However, related work has touched upon managerial ownership (Bruton, Chahine, and 
Filatotchev [2009], Goranova, Alessandri, Brandes, and Dharwadkar [2007], Jain, Jayaraman, 
and Kini [2008]), CEO background and legitimacy (Cohen and Dean [2005]), and board 
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structure (Certo, Covin, Daily, and Dalton [2001], Sanders and Boivie [2004]) as potential 
signals that may limit information asymmetry and provide relevant information to investors. 
Consequently, family ownership, management, and board representation of the firm may be 
considered as signals by investors. Changing any of these factors will be costly for the family, 
thus the benefit of the signal must outweigh the cost of change. However, the effect of this 
signal is dependent upon outside investors attitudes towards family firms. If they believe that 
a high level of family governance enhances shareholder wealth, then we would expect them to 
have a higher likelihood of investing in a firm. We consider the impact of three founding family 
governance dimensions: ownership, management and board representation. 
Agency theory identifies two competing effects of family ownership on shareholder 
wealth: the alignment effect (typical Type I agency conflict) and the entrenchment effect 
(typical Type II agency conflict) (Wang [2006]). According to the alignment effect, family 
ownership has the potential of diminishing Type I agency conflicts by exerting greater 
managerial monitoring. In these firms, family members often hold senior positions, virtually 
eliminating Type I agency conflicts (Bhaumik and Gregoriou [2009]) as there exists natural 
alignment between owners and managers. However, even in cases where the family uses a 
professional manager the undiversified nature of the family’s investment portfolio incentivises 
them to carefully monitor the manager and decrease the incentive for opportunistic 
management behaviour (Prencipe and Bar-Yosef [2011]). Anderson et al. ([2003]) found that 
family firms are able to derive a lower cost of debt, thus indicating that bond-holders perceive 
family ownership as a superior ownership structure. Furthermore, the bridging of the family’s 
reputation and the firm’s reputation provides an incentive for the family to use their position in 
the firm in an appropriate manner (Miller and Le Breton-Miller [2005], Wang [2006]).  
There is however a large amount of literature that argues that concentrated ownership, 
such as family ownership, may lead to an increase in Type II agency conflicts through the 
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entrenchment effect (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny [1988], Schleifer and Vishny [1997]). In 
these situations, the controlling shareholders have an incentive to opportunistically expropriate 
wealth from minority shareholders. Moreover, one of the primary characteristics of family 
firms is the desire for continuity across generations and preservation of socio-emotional wealth 
(Miller and Le Breton-Miller [2005]). This has the potential to detrimentally impact the firm 
as the family may be using their power to prioritize firm survival rather than maximization of 
shareholder wealth (Prencipe, Markarian, and Pozza [2008]). The investors may thus perceive 
family firms to be entrenched and self-interested.  
While agency theory provides competing views about the impact of the family 
ownership signal, it does not consider the individual interpretation of the signal. Two 
individuals receiving the same signal may react in very different ways. This can be related to 
the underlying principles of prospect theory, in that decision-makers (in our case investors) 
may have heterogeneous decision weights that they apply in their choices, and how they 
evaluate the prospect (Kahneman and Tversky [1979]). The evaluation is about the relative 
utility rather than absolute levels. In practice, this reference dependence may manifest itself in 
an investor comparing family and non-family firms but also the levels of family involvement. 
Furthermore, when evaluating the levels of family involvement there may be diminishing 
sensitivity when it comes to the investor’s utility. 
Additionally, from the psychology literature we know that individuals use a number of 
heuristics in their decision making, as a way to simplify complex tasks and increase cognitive 
efficiency (Bailey et al. [2011]). When it comes to the interpretation of the family governance 
signal there are two specific heuristics that may be used by investors. First, representativeness 
is a heuristic that can be used to quickly judge an investment option based on superficial 
characteristics (the signal), rather than underlying probabilities relating to those characteristics. 
In other words, individuals that have a positive attitude towards family businesses in general 




may be biased to invest in family firms even when presented with better alternative investment 
opportunities. Second, familiarity is a heuristic that leads to individuals investing in firms with 
characteristics that are familiar to them. This has most often been used to explain the home bias 
effect, meaning that investors usually prefer to invest in domestic stocks, leading to increased 
portfolio risk. Familiarity can also be used to explain individuals’ preferences with respect to 
family ownership. If an individual has worked or is from a family business, then they may be 
more familiar with this business structure. Consequently, when presented with different 
investment choices they will tend to choose the more familiar option and prefer family 
businesses as compared to non-family businesses. 
As the behavioural literatures acknowledge that individuals have varying biases and 
agency theory provides competing views on the effects of family ownership upon shareholder 
wealth, we choose to use a non-directional hypothesis for this study. We simply posit that 
investors will use the level of family ownership as a signal when making investment decisions.  
H1: Investors use signals of founding family ownership in investment decisions. 
 It is also important to differentiate between family firms where the firm uses a 
professional manager and family firms where the CEO position is held by a family member. 
Similar to non-family firms, family firms with professional CEOs may be considered by 
investors to suffer from Type I agency problems. While the concentrated ownership of the 
family signals greater monitoring; the manager still may act opportunistically (Yang [2010]). 
On the other hand, family members in the CEO position can ensure that the family is able to 
control the firm effectively and according to the wishes of the family (Wang [2006]). As such, 
investors may prefer either family or non-family CEOs, as their position within the firm may 
act as a signal of potential agency issues that impact shareholder wealth. If the family firm is 
opportunistic and extracts benefits from minority shareholders, then we can expect a family 




member in the CEO position to increase this effect as the family then has greater control and 
more opportunities to act self-interested. However, if family firms have better corporate 
governance and the family acts in the best interest of the firm, a family member serving as the 
CEO may further improve this positive effect. They will be able to ensure that the family’s 
strategic direction is implemented.  
 With respect to the interpretation of the signal, ownership by itself does not imply active 
involvement by the family in the governance of the firm. One way to increase influence is by 
having a family member serve as the CEO. Further, the representativeness and familiarity bias 
would suggest that if an individual is biased towards and against family firms then this bias 
may extend to the degree of family involvement, the CEO’s family member status is then 
considered to be an important decision cue. Consequently, we posit that investors may use this 
information as a signal and consider the family relation of the CEO when making investment 
choices. 
H2: Investors use signals of the family relation of a CEO when investing in family firms. 
In addition to exerting influence through its ownership or by having a family member act as 
the CEO, the family may also have members of the family present on the board of directors. 
These directors may further align the firm’s objectives with the objectives of the family 
(Corbetta and Salvato [2004]). The members of the board have previously been considered as 
potential signals to investors, however this has primarily been within IPO contexts (Certo 
[2003]). Similarly, for a family firm, the decision to allocate a certain number of board seats to 
non-family members provides a signal to outside investors with respect to the credibility of the 
firm and also the family’s ability to influence the strategic direction (Anderson and Reeb 
[2004]). If a large proportion of directors have family ties the agency costs may be increased, 
however the alignment of the directors’ values with the wishes of the major shareholders may 
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also have benefits through congruence surrounding the strategic direction of the firm. Once 
again, we posit that representativeness and familiarity bias may lead to individuals using 
signals relating to the family’s representation on the board in their decision process, as their 
bias in relation to family firms may be dependent on the degree of involvement in all aspects 
of governance. 
H3: Investors use signals of the family’s representation on the board of directors when 
investing in family firms. 
The hypotheses thus far have not explicitly addressed the possibility that investors may 
hold a diverse range of preferences with respect to the desired level of founding family 
involvement in a publicly listed firm. The assumption of investor homogeneity is widespread 
in the family firm literature, as it has to date only considered the heterogeneity on the supply 
side, namely within family firms (King and Santor [2008]). However, firm values are not only 
determined by a firm’s future performance but also by the actions and choices of investors. 
According to prospect theory we would expect that there are varying utility functions amongst 
investors. Furthermore, the choices and actions relating to buy, sell, or hold decisions are 
influenced by the beliefs and values investor hold towards founding family involvement. 
Consequently, if investors have heterogeneous preferences, it may be difficult to find a 
generalizable effect of family governance. The notion that investors may hold heterogeneous 
preferences has been studied extensively in asset pricing literature (Basak [2005], Michaely 
and Vila [1995], Wang [1996]). It has further been shown that while investors hold 
heterogeneous preferences that they may be clustered together based on similarities in biases 
and preferences (Bailey et al. [2011], Bateman, Islam, Louviere, Satchell, and Thorp [2011], 
Clark-Murphy and Soutar [2005], Wood and Zaichkowsky [2004]). Differences between the 
aggregate and individual preferences can be large, and clusters allow us to generalize and 
understand what drives the underlying phenomenon, both at an aggregate and individual level 




(Wood and Zaichkowsky [2004]). Consequently, we posit that investors’ preferences cluster 
with respect to the level of founding family governance. 
H4: There are clusters of investors with varying utility functions with respect to founding family 
governance. 
METHOD 
We use two stated preference experiments to test our hypotheses, where participants are 
presented with multiple realistic purchasing (in our case investment) options and asked to 
choose their preferred option (Louviere, Hensher, and Swait [2000]). By using this method, we 
assess the causal effect that signals of founding family governance may have upon the 
investment decisions of nonprofessional investors. It also allows us to ensure the observability 
of the signal, as the investors are presented with limited information in their experimental tasks 
(Bateman et al. [2011], Bateman, Stevens, and Lai [2015], Louviere et al. [2000], McFadden 
[1973]). Stated preference experiments are consistent with prospect theory in that the 
individual’s decision weights can be extrapolated from their preferences. Further, the 
methodology uses a relative decision-making framework rather than absolute, and is thus 
consistent with the principle of reference dependence within prospect theory as securities are 
compared to one another. Because stated preference experiments also provide us with the 
weighting for each level of the attribute (such as level of family ownership), we are also able 
to assess whether there is diminishing sensitivity surrounding the utility gained from family 
governance.  
In experiment one, we present our participants with three alternative investment options 
in the retail sector with varying financial and ownership attributes. The participant is asked to 
select the option they prefer the most, and then select the option they prefer the least. Each 




participant completes ten of these choice tasks, and each time the levels/values for the attributes 
change. Figure 1 presents an example of a choice task used in our first experiment.  
< Insert Figure 1 here > 
In experiment two, we present our participants with three alternative governance 
structures for a family firm in the retail sector with varying governance attributes. The 
participant is asked to select the structure they prefer the most, and then select the structure 
they prefer the least. Each participant completes ten of these choice tasks, and each time the 
levels/values for the attributes change. Figure 2 presents an example of a choice task used in 
our second experiment. 
< Insert Figure 2 here > 
The goal of experiment one is to ascertain if investors consider founding family 
ownership when making investment choices where they are free to choose between family and 
non-family firms. Effectively we are able to provide causal evidence with respect to H1. 
Whereas in experiment two, our goal is to ascertain the preferred governance structure within 
family firms specifically, and thus test H2 and H3.  
Attributes 
We select our attributes using preliminary interviews with nonprofessional investors. In these 
interviews we asked investors what type of information they use when making an investment 
choice and where they source their information. These interviews indicated that the 
overwhelming majority use various personal finance websites such as Yahoo Finance in their 
research prior to purchasing shares. We surveyed personal finance websites to assess what 
information is most commonly provided to nonprofessional investors, and how it is presented. 
Based on this process we identified five primary financial attributes that are used in the 
choice process. These are: (1) net profit margin; (2) revenue growth; (3) return on assets; (4) 
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price-earnings ratio; and, (5) beta (risk). We used a major retail company to assess probable 
values for each of these financial attributes. These attributes and their respective levels are 
listed in Table 1.  
< Insert Table 1 here > 
To assess the influence of founding family ownership and governance structure we use 
four governance attributes. These are: (6) founding family ownership; (7) institutional and 
mutual fund owners; (8) the family relation of the chief executive officer; and, (9) the number 
of family members on the board of directors. The first two governance attributes are used in 
both experiment one and two, whereas the last two are only used in experiment two. We choose 
the governance attributes based on their importance in the family firm literature and on their 
availability to nonprofessional investors. Information on major shareholders is readily 
available to investors on personal finance websites and we use similar phrasing to increase the 
realism of our tasks. As these attributes are categorical we are able to observe the diminishing 
sensitivity with respect to the utility an investor receives from investing in a security that 
exhibits those attribute levels. 
Participants 
We recruit 250 nonprofessional investors from an online research panel, administrated by the 
market research firm Cint. These nonprofessional investors were asked to participate in a study 
in exchange for a fixed nominal monetary reward that was provided by the market research 
firm. While the monetary reward is fixed the market research firm has quality controls that 
excludes participants for behaviour such as random responding, illogical or inconsistent 
responding, and completing the questions too quickly (speeding). The participants were 
selected based on their country of residence (United States) and their status as a stock market 
investor. Specifically, a screening question was used to assess the types of financial products 




held by the potential participants, and only individuals who indicated that they held stocks were 
then invited to complete the study. We chose to limit our participants to a single country to 
avoid institutional and cultural effects on our results. In contrast to prior research that has often 
used student samples as proxies for nonprofessional investors we used an online market 
research panel to assist us in recruiting actual nonprofessional investors. 
Procedure 
We conduct our experiment in an online setting. The participants are given instructions. In the 
first stage, they proceed to experiment one where they complete ten investment choice tasks. 
Once completed, they proceed to the second stage, where they complete the ten investment 
choice tasks as part of experiment two. In their third stage, they answer a number of questions 
relating to their attitude and experience with family businesses. Lastly, they provide 
demographic details. The median time to complete the procedure was 19.5 minutes. 
Covariates 
We measure a number of additional nonexperimental factors that we use to explain the 
variability in the decision-weights with respect to family governance preferences. We assess 
the attitude towards family businesses by modifying a well-used reputation measurement scale 
that asks participants to rate how they perceive family businesses on a number of dimensions 
(quality, innovativeness, human resources, social responsibility, trustworthiness, management, 
competitiveness, profit-drive, long-term investment value) (Fombrun and Shanley [1990], 
McGuire, Schneeweis, and Branch [1990]). See appendix A for details of the reputation 
measurement scale. We use principal component analysis to reduce this nine item scale to a 
one item factor that represents the participant’s attitude towards family businesses. In addition, 
we ask participants if they have worked in a family business or if their family owns a business. 
We conjecture that these attitudes and prior experiences are the antecedents to the underlying 




preferences and biases of individuals. We also gather demographical data on our participants 
(gender, age, ethnicity, education, employment, investment experience, investment activity). 
Finally, we also posit that an investor’s investment horizon and risk tolerance may influence 
their decision to invest in a family firm and thus assess these two variables by adopting two 
questions from the Survey of Consumer Finances, which is widely used in prior research 
(Jianakoplos and Bernasek [1998], Roger and Suarez [1983]). See appendix A for details of 
the investment horizon and risk tolerance measures. 
Coding 
We use a logit model to assess the attributes and their level’s influence on the choices of 
investors. Each participant completed 10 investment choice tasks where they selected the most 
and least preferred choice between three options (A, B, and C). We explode the dataset by 
coding for pseudo observations. For example, if the participant chooses A as their most 
preferred and C as their least preferred then we have two sets of observations. In the first set of 
three options, we code option A as 1 and options B and C as 0. In the second set of the two 
remaining options, we code option B as 1 and option C as 0. This coding provides 5 
observations per task, comprised of two choice sets. As the participants each complete 10 
investment choice tasks, we collect 50 observations per participant for each experiment. 
Analysis 
The data from the experiment is analysed using an indirect utility function in accordance to 
random utility theory (McFadden [1973]), where the dependent variable is choice. As the 
choices are conditional on the alternatives being presented in each task (thus accounting for 
reference dependence), the conditional logit model (CLM) is used to estimate the utility 
function of the participants. As we have coded for pseudo observations, our conditional logit 
model is effectively identical to a rank ordered logit model. 




 However, these main results from the conditional logit model do not account for 
heterogeneous preferences amongst participants. To model the heterogeneous preferences 
amongst participants, latent class analysis is used to uncover clusters (groups) within 
participants that have distinct utility functions. We perform the latent class analysis using the 
expectation maximization (EM) algorithm (Dempster, Laird, and Rubin [1977]) and the 
Newton-Raphson algorithm (Lindstrom and Bates [1988]). These algorithms go through an 
iterative process of finding latent clusters within our sample that have homogenous utility 
functions. Subsequently, the conditional logit model is used to fit a utility function for each 
distinct homogenous cluster. 
In our robustness procedures, we also employ a mixed logit model to address any 
remaining unobserved variability within the latent clusters. This ensures that our results are not 
sensitive to the assumption of homogeneity within the latent clusters. 
RESULTS 
Demographic Statistics 
We begin by reviewing the demographical information of our participants that is shown in 
Table 2. The sample was balanced with respect to gender, with 52% men and 48% women. 
Additionally, the age demographics of our sample show a fairly balanced distribution across 
the age groups, with only 7% of participants being between 18-24 years old. Roughly 88% of 
our participants had some form of college education, with Bachelor's degree holder being the 
most common and representing 39% of the sample, whereas 22% had a Master's degree or 
above. As a result of our participants being older, their investment experience is quite 
extensive, 39% of our sample has been involved in trading stocks for over 10 years and the 
most common level of trading activity is between 20-29 trades per year (41%). While the 
participants have diverse investment horizons, the most common one is a few months (32%)   




< Insert Table 2 here > 
Experiment One 
We present our results from experiment one in Table 3. Exploring the results from the pooled 
conditional logit model it appears that the participants used the majority of attributes in their 
decision-making.  
< Insert Table 3 here > 
Expectedly, participants prefer higher net profit margins, higher revenue growth, and 
higher return on average assets. However, information with respect to price-to-earnings ratios 
or beta was not widely used in decision making when looking at the pooled model, with 
participants only preferring a beta value of 1.2 over 1.4. Focusing on H1, and the usage of 
family ownership as a signal, we find evidence of a positive effect of family ownership upon 
the likelihood of investment choice. However, we observe that the likelihood of choice is 
highest at 20% family ownership. The largest shift in likelihood of choice is from 0% to 10%, 
meaning that we find evidence of diminishing sensitivity when it comes to the level of family 
ownership. We also find a positive effect for the ownership level of mutual funds and 
institutional holders. In general, investors appear to view signals of block ownership in a 
positive light, irrespective if the blockholder is a family or not.  
 To relax the assumption of investor homogeneity we use latent class analysis to identify 
clusters of investors with varying utility functions. We use a Newton-Raphson algorithm to 
maximize the log likelihood while maintaining parsimony and find a three cluster solution that 
we present in Table 3. Interestingly, the three clusters of investors have distinct decision-
weights and thus utility functions with respect to founding family ownership. Cluster one, 
representing 31% of investors, have a positive utility function with respect to family ownership. 
However, the utility they derive from family ownership continues to rise after 20% ownership, 




as 30% family ownership gives them the highest utility. Furthermore, the results also show that 
this cluster of investors pay strong attention to all forms of blockholders, and that these signals 
are more important than the financial information presented. In contrast, Cluster two, which 
make up 45% of the sample, have a negative utility function with respect to founding family 
ownership, as they prefer 0% family ownership versus 30%. Interestingly, this cluster also 
prefers 0% institutional ownership versus 30%, meaning that they seem to be averse to 
blockholders in general. Cluster three, which makes up 25% of the sample, has a strong 
negative utility function with respect to family ownership, while still preferring 10% 
institutional ownership over the baseline of 0%.  Interestingly, this cluster does not use many 
of the other information in decision-making, meaning that the governance information appears 
to be very important for their decision making.  
Experiment Two 
In experiment two, we focus on the preferred governance structure within family firms. We 
present our results from experiment two in Table 4.  
< Insert Table 4 here > 
We begin by exploring the results from the pooled conditional logit model. We find 
that on average our participants prefer a family member to hold the CEO position. In contrast, 
we find a non-linear effect for the representation of family members on the board of directors. 
Investors most preferred the structure where 2 out of 8 board members are from the family, 
whereas if 6 out of the 8 board members are from the family then investors prefer to have no 
family representation at all. Similar to our results from experiment one we also find a positive 
effect of founding family ownership. However, we find that the utility continues to rise to 30% 
family ownership, whereas in experiment one the utility was maximized at 20% family 
ownership. However, while the utility continuous to rise to 30% family ownership, the 




underlying utility function displays evidence of diminishing sensitivity as the is a decelerating 
increase (convex) in utility. Furthermore, we also find that investors have a positive attitude 
towards nonfamily blockholders. 
We continue by exploring the latent class structure in our data. Similar to our results 
from experiment one we find a three cluster solution that maximizes the log likelihood of our 
models while maintaining explanatory parsimony. Cluster one shows a clear preference for 
family involvement in the governance structure of the firm and represents 40% of the 
respondents. Their utility is maximized when the CEO is a family member, 6 out of 8 directors 
are family members, and when the family holds 30% of the firm’s shares. Furthermore, they 
also prefer the involvement of institutional and mutual fund owners in the firm. Cluster two, 
representing 21% of respondents, has a somewhat positive perception of family involvement 
in governance. While this cluster of investors do not care whether the CEO is a family member, 
they prefer 2 out of 8 board members to be family members. They also prefer higher levels of 
family ownership as well as institutional ownership. Similar to our findings in experiment one, 
cluster three representing 39% of respondents, has a negative preference for family 
involvement in the firm. These individuals prefer to have a non-family CEO, have no family 
members on the board, and have no family ownership in these firms. They also have a negative 
view of institutional owners.  
Cluster Membership Prediction 
To further understand the differences between clusters, we estimate a multinomial logit to 
explore the variation in attitudes towards family firms, exposure to family firms, and the 
demographics between clusters. Table 5 presents the results from our analysis. We use cluster 
one as the base outcome, which is positively disposed to family governance. We focus our 
discussion on the differences between cluster one and three, as these had a clear preference for 
and against family governance, whereas cluster two was somewhat more neutral. 
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In experiment one, we find that cluster three has a more negative attitude towards family 
businesses compared to cluster one. This is in line with our main results, which found that 
cluster three has a negative preference for family ownership. This suggests that the prior 
attitude towards family businesses can explain the preferences in the experiment. However, we 
do not find that being from or having worked for a family business can explain cluster 
membership. Consequently, we find evidence of a representativeness bias, whereas familiarity 
with family businesses is not able to explain cluster membership. When we look at the other 
demographics, there are other significant associations (such as ethnicity and investment 
activity), however, none of these map into systematic heuristics. 
In experiment two, we similarly find that cluster three has a more negative attitude 
towards family businesses as compared to cluster one. In experiment two, membership in 
cluster one and three is greater than in experiment one, suggesting a more definitive separation 
between the preferences of participants. This could perhaps be due to the differences in the 
decision-task, as experiment one focused on family ownership versus non-family ownership, 
whereas experiment two considered broader governance issues within family firms. We 
reaffirm the pattern from experiment one, respondent attitudes to family firms correspond to 
cluster membership. Again suggesting that there is an underlying representativeness bias with 
respect to family governance. We also find that demographics can to some extent inform us 
about cluster membership with respect to family governance preferences. We find that cluster 
three is more educated than cluster one and have a somewhat shorter investment horizon. 
Interestingly, in both experiment one and two, we do not find that risk tolerance is 
significantly related to cluster membership. This indicates that family governance is not 
considered to be a risk factor for investors. 
< Insert Table 5 here > 





 Substitution Effects. Our results from both experiments show that investors have clear 
preferences with respect to both family ownership and institutional ownership, and that these 
two attributes are both used by investors in their decision-making. However, it could be that 
investors do not discriminate between these two groups and view both family and institutional 
owners as blockholders. To investigate this, we explore any substitution effects (and at the 
same time complementary effects) between these two types of ownership structures. We 
interact the levels of these two attributes (for each level of ownership) and include them as 
explanatory variables in our analysis. We find that none of the interaction terms are significant 
in explaining investor choice. Consequently, we conclude that there is no substitution between 
family ownership and institutional ownership, meaning that investors see them as two different 
types of blockholders. 
 Assumption of homogeneity. In our robustness test we use a mixed logit model to 
account for any unobserved variability that may remain within each of the identified cluster. 
The results from these analyses do not change our conclusions and are thus omitted for brevity; 
however, it is worth noting that there is evidence of heterogeneous preferences within each 
cluster. 
DISCUSSION 
In this paper, we show that nonprofessional investors use signals of founding family 
governance in their investment choices. In the models that assume investor homogeneity, we 
find a positive effect of founding family ownership, management, and board representation 
upon the utility of nonprofessional investors. However, using latent class analysis we find that 
there are three distinct clusters within our sample that have conflicting utility curves with 
respect to founding family governance. In experiment one, where we focus on founding family 




ownership in itself, we find that the two clusters that have a negative view of founding family 
ownership is larger. However, the smaller cluster of investors who have a positive utility 
function with respect to founding family ownership have a much stronger preference for 
investing in firms with high level of founding family ownership, leading to a positive net effect 
in the pooled model.  
 In experiment two, we find similar trends with respect to the latent structure of our data. 
The pooled model shows that participants have a positive view of family involvement in the 
governance of a family firm. However, using latent class analysis we again find three distinct 
clusters with conflicting utility curves. Cluster one has a clear preference for family 
involvement whereas cluster two is somewhat less positive. Interestingly, a number of 
participants that belonged to cluster two in experiment one, are now classified to belong to 
cluster one in experiment two. This implies that while these investors prefer to invest in non-
family firm in general, if they are investing in a family firm, then they prefer the family to 
influence the governance of the firm.  
 Our findings are consistent with prospect theory, in that we observe the principle of 
reference dependence in the decision-making of investors as they compare investment 
alternatives with varying attributes. We also find evidence of diminishing sensitivity 
surrounding the utility investors gain from family ownership as the largest gain in utility is 
observed in the change from no family ownership to 10% family ownership. The overall results 
are also consistent with individuals using different decision-weights in their choices, as we find 
three clusters of investors with conflicting preferences in each experiment. 
Why are heterogeneous preferences of investors important to the family business 
literature? The question is similar to that asked in the early experimental and behavioural 
finance literatures. It is the role of researchers to test the rational pricing assumption that 




underpins the asset pricing literature as part of validating the theories that we use to explain 
and predict phenomena. Experiments simplify the complex world and allow us to test 
theoretical predictions. If the theory is valid then the predictions should still hold in the less 
complex world of experiments where we and observe the causal impact of exogenous changes 
the researcher introduces (Noussair and Tucker [2013], Sunder [2007]). In the family business 
literature, the assumption is that aggregate market behaviour is the rational outcome and thus 
a higher Tobin’s q for family governed firms means that family involvement is value 
enhancing. However, the empirical literature is somewhat mixed on whether this is true or 
significant for all family governed firms. The conflicting results suggest a more complex 
underlying effect than the simple zero-one family effect studied to date.  
Our results suggest that rather than an agency theory phenomenon we are actually 
dealing with heterogeneous preferences phenomenon similar to that found in the experimental 
asset pricing literature (Noussair and Tucker [2013]). We have identified that there are at least 
two significant clusters of investors with diametrically opposed views as whether family 
governance in firms is value enhancing or value destroying. Specifically, we find evidence of 
a representativeness bias, as the pro-family involvement cluster also has a positive attitude 
towards family firms. This finding is in line with the prior work of Aspara and Tikkanen 
[2008]] who found that company related attitudes is an antecedent to stock and product 
purchases. We believe that further work is needed to try and unravel why these investors hold 
these opposing views and perhaps how these attitudes are generated. 
Our study has several limitations. First, we use a laboratory setting in testing our 
hypotheses. While stated preference experiments are considered realistic purchase scenarios in 
marketing research (Louviere et al. [2000]), we might question if the realism translates to 
investment scenarios. Consequently, there may be some threats to the external validity of our 
study. Participants may be using the information we provide because it is present even if they 




would not consider this in real life. However, we find a systematic pattern in how they used 
the information, and we find that there is a differential use across the clusters which is not 
consistent with a mechanical approach. Furthermore, there is a well-established literature in 
experimental finance and economics where experiments, even simple experiments, are a valid 
methodology to gain insights into the parameters and expectations that underlie the observed 
market phenomena (Assenza, Bao, Hommes, and Massaro [2014], Sunder [2007]). Similarly, 
the current experiment has shown that investors do not have homogeneous preferences for 
family governance so we now know that the aggregate market evidence to date is likely to be 
the net impact of investors with both positive and negative weights on family governance. To 
fully understand the extant evidence on aggregate market value of family involvement we need 
to conduct further experiments to tease out investor preferences, biases and valuation weights. 
This work may show, as in other areas of economics and finance, that individual investor 
expectation formation may be a rational processes or may be simple heuristics (Assenza et al. 
[2014]). 
Second, in this study we focus on nonprofessional investors. Therefore, we are limited 
to making conclusions with respect to this distinct investor group, and our results cannot be 
extrapolated to institutional investors. However, we screened for and collect data on the 
investment activity of our respondents. As a result our subjects are active investors and not 
students like much of the early experimental research in finance (Sunder [2007]). Furthermore, 
our respondents are representative of private investors that constitute about a third of the US 
stock market by ownership. While this is a significant proportion the other two thirds are 
institutional investors whose expectation formation process may be different to private 
investors. Future work will need to investigate institutions versus private investor behaviours. 
Third, we contextualize our experiments in the retail industry, and thus the effects may 
be limited to this particular industry. However, prior literature has not indicated that this 
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industry is in any way unique when it comes to the agency issues related to founding family 
governance. Fourthly, our participants are limited to nonprofessional investors in the United 
States. It is questionable if similar results would be observed in other cultural settings. 
Anecdotally, consumers in East Asia have a negative view of family firms as they see them as 
corrupt and nepotistic, consequently we may find very different results in these cultural settings 
(Fan and Wong [2002]). 
Finally, we use a fixed nominal monetary incentive in our experiments. This may lead 
to participants to devote insufficient effort in completing the tasks. However, as this would 
result in non-significant findings (due to random responses), and we find significant results 
across our two experiments, we thus believe that this is a minor limitation. Further, the market 
research firm has quality controls that excludes participants for behaviour that results in low 
quality responses. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, our study is unique and contributes to the literature 
on several issues. Research has thus far focused on aggregate market outcomes of founding 
family ownership (Anderson and Reeb [2003], Villalonga and Amit [2006]). In contrast, we 
focus on the micro-decisions of individual nonprofessional investors and explore how they use 
signals relating to founding family governance. Prior work either explicitly or implicitly 
assumed investor homogeneity with respect to their preferences and views of founding family 
ownership. In this paper, we presented evidence that this assumption is violated in the market, 
as we find significant investor heterogeneity, and specifically two distinct clusters that have 
conflicting utility curves with respect to founding family ownership. This implies that the 
simplistic view of investors that the prior literature has used may be incorrect and consequently 
we believe that there is a fruitful research area in focusing on the micro-decisions of investors 
to explore this heterogeneity of preferences further.  




The current study is but a first step to unravel these issues. Future work can build on 
our work to tease out what drives heterogeneous preferences with respect to family governance. 
Do investors entertain varying expectations about the agency behaviour of family agents? Have 
they been exposed to family firms in prior investments or business experience and this anchors 
their expectations because of familiarity or prior positive or negative experiences? Are 
investors adopting simple heuristics that may not be rational? And to what extent do individual 
investor characteristics aggregate to market behaviour or does institutional behaviour, that may 
be quite different, drive aggregate market behaviour? 
 
  




Table 1: Attributes and levels used in experimental design 
Experiment Attribute Level 







   







   







   







   







   










   







   30% 
   
Two CEO is a Family Member No 
  Yes 
   
   
Two Family Members on the BOD None 
  2 out of 8 
  4 out of 8 
  6 out of 8 
Notes: The table shows the attributes and levels used in the experimental design. Two of the attributes were used 
in both experiments.  




Figure 1: Example of choice task in experiment one 
Instructions:    
You are considering to invest in a multinational clothing and accessories retailer 
that is based in the United States. If these were your only options which one would 
you prefer to invest in? 
    
 Company A Company B Company C 
Net Profit Margin 7% 9% 8% 
Revenue Growth 8% 6% 6% 
Return on Assets 15% 14% 16% 
Price-Earnings Ratio 25 17 17 
Beta (Risk) 1.3 1.2 1.4 
% of Shares Held by Founding 
Family 
0% 20% 30% 
% of Shares Held by Institutions 
& Mutual Funds 
20% 0% 10% 
    
Most Preferred Investment   
Least Preferred Investment   
 
Notes: An example of a choice task used in the experiment one. Each participant completed ten tasks, with the 
only difference between the tasks being the levels within each attribute (factor). 
  




Figure 2: Example of choice task in experiment two 
Instructions:    
This retailer was founded 40 years ago by a family, it is now a multinational 
corporation and the family is still actively involved in the business. Assuming 
these three alternatives have the same financial performance, which governance 
structure and level of family involvement would you prefer the most and which 
would you prefer the least. 
    
 Option A Option B Option C 
Chief Executive Officer 
CEO is a 
family 
member 
CEO is not a 
family 
member 
CEO is a 
family 
member 
Number of founding family 
members who sit on the board 
None 4 out of 8 6 out of 8 
% of Shares Held by Founding 
Family 
10% 20% 30% 
% of Shares Held by Institutions 
& Mutual Funds 
10% 30% 10% 
    
Most Preferred    
Least Preferred    
 
Notes: An example of a choice task used in experiment two. Each participant completed ten tasks, with the only 
difference between the tasks being the levels within each attribute (factor). 
  




Table 2: Demographic overview of participants 
Variable Level n % 
Worked for Family Business Yes 139 56% 
 No 111 44% 
From Family Business Yes 71 28% 
 No 179 72% 
Gender Male 129 52% 
 Female 121 48% 
Age 18-24 17 7% 
 25-34 78 31% 
 35-49 59 24% 
 50-64 48 19% 
 65 + 48 19% 
Ethnicity White 188 75% 
 Hispanic or Latino 26 10% 
 Black or African American 15 6% 
 Asian 17 7% 
 Other 4 2% 
Education High School 30 12% 
 Some College Education 66 26% 
 Bachelor's Degree 98 39% 
 Master's Degree or above 56 22% 
Employment Status Salary worker 143 57% 
 Self-employment 43 17% 
 Not working 17 7% 
 Retired 47 19% 
Investing Experience Less than 1 year 19 8% 
 1-4 years 69 28% 
 5-9 years 65 26% 
 10 years or more 97 39% 
Investing Activity 1-9 trades per year 103 41% 
 10-19 trades per year 75 30% 
 20-29 trades year 37 15% 
 30 or more trades per year 35 14% 
Investment Horizon A few days 32 13% 
 A few months 81 32% 
 The next year 39 16% 
 The next few years 49 20% 
 The next 5 to 10 years 32 13% 
 Longer than 10 years 17 7% 
Risk Tolerance Substantial risk 57 23% 
 Above average risk 95 38% 
 Average risk  87 35% 
  No risk 11 4% 
Notes: Demographical overview of the 250 participants in the experiment. 
   
    




Table 3: Results from experiment one – the effect of family ownership 
  Pooled Cluster One Cluster Two Cluster Three 
Attribute Level β SE β SE β SE β SE 
          
Net Profit Margin 8% 0.218*** (0.040) 0.083 (0.080) 0.430*** (0.064) 0.152* (0.087) 
 9% 0.448*** (0.042) 0.227*** (0.083) 0.922*** (0.068) 0.052 (0.088) 
Revenue Growth 7% 0.160*** (0.040) -0.061 (0.080) 0.307*** (0.062) 0.131 (0.087) 
 8% 0.329*** (0.040) 0.196** (0.081) 0.583*** (0.064) 0.123 (0.087) 
Return on Assets 15% 0.130*** (0.040) 0.126 (0.078) 0.218*** (0.063) 0.097 (0.087) 
 16% 0.260*** (0.041) 0.264*** (0.081) 0.506*** (0.065) -0.058 (0.085) 
Price-Earnings Ratio 21 -0.049 (0.040) 0.036 (0.081) 0.255*** (0.064) -0.693*** (0.088) 
 25 0.012 (0.041) 0.169** (0.082) 0.485*** (0.065) -0.938*** (0.091) 
Beta (Risk) 1.3 -0.051 (0.040) 0.099 (0.081) -0.063 (0.063) -0.153* (0.085) 
 1.4 -0.217*** (0.041) -0.172** (0.081) -0.447*** (0.064) 0.136 (0.085) 
% of Shares Held by 
Founding Family 
10% 0.087* (0.049) 0.593*** (0.099) 0.030 (0.078) -0.342*** (0.103) 
20% 0.137*** (0.048) 0.744*** (0.100) 0.097 (0.077) -0.409*** (0.105) 
30% 0.129** (0.051) 1.098*** (0.105) -0.137* (0.081) -0.357*** (0.106) 
% of Shares Held by 
Institutions & Mutual 
Funds 
10% 0.294*** (0.049) 0.917*** (0.098) 0.010 (0.077) 0.188* (0.105) 
20% 0.335*** (0.050) 1.331*** (0.110) -0.084 (0.078) 0.098 (0.103) 
30% 0.392*** (0.051) 1.941*** (0.116) -0.180** (0.079) -0.160 (0.105) 
          
Observations  12,500  3,850  5,650  3,000  
Pseudo R2  0.0374  0.1896  0.1132  0.0830  
Notes: The results are estimated using a conditional logit model on exploded choice data from 250 participants who completed 10 choice tasks each, ranking three investments 
in each task. The cluster model results show a three cluster solution using the Newton-Raphson algorithm. The dependent variable is choice (preferred investment) and the 
independent variables are the attribute levels. The first level of every variable has been omitted and used as a baseline (7% for net profit margin, 6% for revenue growth, 14% 
for return on average assets, 17 for price to earnings ratio, 1.2 for beta, 0% for family ownership, and 0% for institutional and mutual fund ownership). Robust standard errors 
in parentheses. Significance annotations are as follows: 
* p .05 
** p .01 
*** p .001 




Table 4: Results from experiment two – the effect of family governance 
  Pooled Cluster One Cluster Two Cluster Three 
Attribute Level β SE β SE β SE β SE 
          
Chief Executive Officer is a family member Yes 0.075** (0.034) 0.741*** (0.058) 0.033 (0.082) -0.569*** (0.060) 
Family members on the board of directors 2 out of 8 0.186*** (0.049) 0.532*** (0.083) 0.298** (0.125) -0.204** (0.084) 
4 out of 8 0.092* (0.049) 0.919*** (0.086) 0.179 (0.122) -0.824*** (0.084) 
6 out of 8 -0.093* (0.050) 1.082*** (0.088) -0.267** (0.127) -1.290*** (0.092) 
% of Shares Held by Founding Family 10% 0.187*** (0.048) 0.304*** (0.083) 0.741*** (0.127) -0.038 (0.084) 
20% 0.331*** (0.049) 0.525*** (0.084) 1.103*** (0.133) -0.103 (0.081) 
30% 0.355*** (0.050) 0.763*** (0.089) 1.286*** (0.139) -0.377*** (0.086) 
% of Shares Held by Institutions & Mutual 
Funds 
10% 0.276*** (0.049) 0.159* (0.081) 1.183*** (0.138) 0.050 (0.084) 
20% 0.366*** (0.049) 0.216** (0.084) 2.059*** (0.149) -0.080 (0.083) 
30% 0.373*** (0.050) 0.094 (0.083) 2.524*** (0.160) -0.199** (0.086) 
          
Observations  12,500  4,950  2,700  4,850  
Pseudo R2  0.0200  0.1287  0.2668  0.1181  
Notes: The results are estimated using a conditional logit model on exploded choice data from 250 participants who completed 10 choice tasks each, ranking three options in 
each task. The cluster model results show a three cluster solution using the Newton-Raphson algorithm. The dependent variable is choice (preferred investment) and the 
independent variables are the attribute levels. The first level of every variable has been omitted and used as a baseline (Family member is not the CEO, No family members 
are on the board, 0% family ownership, and 0% institutional and mutual fund ownership). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance annotations are as follows: 
* p .05 
** p .01 
*** p .001 
  




Table 5: Prediction of cluster membership 
 Experiment One  Experiment Two 
 Cluster Two Cluster Three  Cluster Two Cluster Three 
 β SE β SE  β SE β SE 
          
Family Business Attitude -0.317 (0.206) -0.414* (0.217)  -0.0761 (0.218) -0.483** (0.196) 
Worked for Family Business          
No 0.326 (0.421) 0.475 (0.479)  0.229 (0.505) -0.189 (0.387) 
From Family Business          
No 0.526 (0.454) 0.332 (0.510)  0.314 (0.516) 0.193 (0.441) 
Gender          
Female -0.522 (0.397) -0.594 (0.406)  0.0875 (0.451) -0.355 (0.358) 
Age          
25-34 0.689 (0.714) 0.432 (0.775)  -0.208 (0.906) -0.0641 (0.741) 
35-49 1.432* (0.792) 0.590 (0.877)  0.249 (1.039) -0.261 (0.783) 
50-64 1.031 (0.880) 0.744 (0.968)  1.788 (1.172) 0.383 (0.846) 
65 + -0.0206 (1.047) 0.517 (1.143)  3.135** (1.423) 0.116 (1.067) 
Ethnicity          
Hispanic or Latino 0.478 (0.670) 0.322 (0.767)  -0.458 (0.796) 0.0677 (0.624) 
Black or African American -1.043* (0.630) 0.226 (0.677)  -0.388 (0.754) -1.365** (0.623) 
Asian -1.260* (0.696) -1.464 (0.946)  1.761** (0.761) 0.0803 (0.756) 
Other 0.248 (1.118) -13.62*** (1.005)  -14.89*** (1.258) -0.843 (1.066) 
Education          
Some College Education -0.375 (0.576) 0.0401 (0.733)  -0.177 (0.780) 0.161 (0.681) 
Bachelor's Degree 0.686 (0.538) 0.408 (0.670)  0.621 (0.669) 1.012 (0.622) 
Master's Degree or above -0.0839 (0.618) 0.510 (0.718)  0.883 (0.754) 1.791** (0.711) 
Employment Status          
Self-employment 0.267 (0.556) 0.0479 (0.558)  0.138 (0.635) 0.00645 (0.533) 
Not working 1.233 (0.945) 1.011 (0.944)  -0.00372 (0.926) 0.333 (0.695) 
Retired 0.145 (0.675) -0.523 (0.740)  -0.595 (0.734) 0.0929 (0.701) 
Investing Experience          




 Experiment One  Experiment Two 
 Cluster Two Cluster Three  Cluster Two Cluster Three 
 β SE β SE  β SE β SE 
1-4 years 0.198 (0.662) -0.0191 (0.847)  0.00995 (0.780) -0.183 (0.772) 
5-9 years 0.532 (0.753) 0.819 (0.943)  -0.563 (0.877) -0.233 (0.824) 
10 years or more -0.629 (0.718) -0.0420 (0.936)  -0.673 (0.955) -0.0101 (0.879) 
Investing Activity          
10-19 trades per year -1.309*** (0.454) -1.040** (0.510)  -0.260 (0.504) -0.682 (0.427) 
20-29 trades year -0.246 (0.603) 0.700 (0.617)  0.0678 (0.660) -0.0571 (0.576) 
30 or more trades per year 0.689 (0.613) 0.810 (0.668)  -1.147 (0.712) -0.660 (0.530) 
Investment Horizon          
A few months 0.637 (0.590) -0.161 (0.626)  -0.418 (0.725) -1.099** (0.555) 
The next year 0.973 (0.694) -0.402 (0.789)  0.448 (0.818) -0.249 (0.652) 
The next few years -0.134 (0.710) -0.411 (0.721)  0.125 (0.830) -0.236 (0.650) 
The next 5 to 10 years 0.592 (0.735) -0.380 (0.776)  -0.997 (0.997) -1.124* (0.643) 
Longer than 10 years 1.285 (0.918) -0.219 (1.048)  -0.395 (1.103) -1.281 (0.831) 
Risk Tolerance          
Above average risk -0.0650 (0.538) -0.00366 (0.584)  -0.808 (0.639) 0.431 (0.488) 
Average risk  -0.240 (0.525) -0.510 (0.610)  -1.240* (0.666) 0.131 (0.516) 
No risk 0.979 (1.455) 0.352 (1.341)  -2.065 (1.536) 0.620 (0.864) 
          
Constant -0.759 (1.078) -0.693 (1.244)  -0.726 (1.509) 0.159 (1.083) 
Observations 250     250    
Pseudo R2 0.1486     0.1619    
Notes: The results are estimated using a multinomial logit model using cluster one as the base outcome. The dependent variable is cluster membership (based on the 
respective experiments) and the independent variables are the covariates (family business attitude, gender, age, ethnicity, education, employment, investment experience, 
investment activity, investment horizon and risk tolerance). Family business attitude is the factor score based on the nine item family business attitude scale – see appendix 
A). The first level of every categorical variable has been omitted and used as a baseline (Worked for Family Business: Yes; From Family Business: Yes; Gender: Male; Age: 
18-24; Ethnicity: White; Education: High school; Employment Status: Salary worker; Investing Experience: Less than 1 year; Investing Activity: 1-9 trades per year; 
Investment Horizon: A few days; Risk Tolerance: Substantial risk). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance annotations are as follows: 
* p .10 
** p .05 
*** p .01 




Anderson, R. C., Mansi, S. A., and Reeb, D. M. "Founding family ownership and the agency 
cost of debt". Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 68, No. 2, (2003), pp. 263-285. 
Anderson, R. C., and Reeb, D. M. "Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: 
Evidence from the S&P 500". Journal of Finance, Vol. 58, No. 3, (2003), pp. 1301-
1328. 
Anderson, R. C., and Reeb, D. M. "Board composition: Balancing family influence in S&P 
500 firms". Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 2, (2004), pp. 209-237. 
Aspara, J., and Tikkanen, H. "Interactions of Individuals' Company-Related Attitudes and 
Their Buying of Companies' Stocks and Products". Journal of Behavioral Finance, 
Vol. 9, No. 2, (2008), pp. 85-94. 
Aspara, J., and Tikkanen, H. "The Role of Company Affect in Stock Investments: Towards 
Blind, Undemanding, Noncomparative and Committed Love". Journal of Behavioral 
Finance, Vol. 11, No. 2, (2010), pp. 103-113. 
Aspara, J., and Tikkanen, H. "Individuals’ Affect-Based Motivations to Invest in Stocks: 
Beyond Expected Financial Returns and Risks". Journal of Behavioral Finance, Vol. 
12, No. 2, (2011), pp. 78-89. 
Assenza, T., Bao, T., Hommes, C., and Massaro, D. "Experiments on expectations in 
macroeconomics and finance". Experiments in macroeconomics, Vol. 17, No., (2014), 
pp. 11-70. 
Astrachan, J. H., and Shanker, M. C. "Family businesses’ contribution to the US economy: A 
closer look". Family Business Review, Vol. 16, No. 3, (2003), pp. 211-219. 
Bailey, W., Kumar, A., and Ng, D. "Behavioral biases of mutual fund investors". Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 102, No. 1, (2011), pp. 1-27. 
Basak, S. "Asset pricing with heterogeneous beliefs". Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 
29, No. 11, (2005), pp. 2849-2881. 
Bateman, H., Islam, T., Louviere, J., Satchell, S., and Thorp, S. "Retirement Investor Risk 
Tolerance in Tranquil and Crisis Periods: Experimental Survey Evidence". Journal of 
Behavioral Finance, Vol. 12, No. 4, (2011), pp. 201-218. 
Bateman, H., Stevens, R., and Lai, A. "Risk Information and Retirement Investment Choice 
Mistakes Under Prospect Theory". Journal of Behavioral Finance, Vol. 16, No. 4, 
(2015), pp. 279-296. 
Bhaumik, S. K., and Gregoriou, A. "'Family' ownership, tunneling and earnings management: 
A review of the literature". Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 24, No. 4, (2009), pp. 
705-730.
Blackburn, D. W., and Ukhov, A. D. "Individual vs. Aggregate Preferences: The Case of a 
Small Fish in a Big Pond". Management Science, Vol. 59, No. 2, (2013), pp. 470-484. 
Bruton, G. D., Chahine, S., and Filatotchev, I. "Founders, private equity investors, and 
underpricing in entrepreneurial IPOs". Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 
33, No. 4, (2009), pp. 909-928. 
Carcello, J. V., Hermanson, D. R., and Ye, Z. "Corporate governance research in accounting 
and auditing: Insights, practice implications, and future research directions". Auditing: 
A Journal of Practice & Theory, Vol. 30, No. 3, (2011), pp. 1-31. 
Certo, S. T. "Influencing initial public offering investors with prestige: Signaling with board 
structures". Academy of Management Review, Vol. 28, No. 3, (2003), pp. 432-446. 
Certo, S. T., Covin, J. G., Daily, C. M., and Dalton, D. R. "Wealth and the effects of founder 
management among IPO‐stage new ventures". Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 
22, No. 6‐7, (2001), pp. 641-658. 




Clark-Murphy, M., and Soutar, G. "Individual Investor Preferences: A Segmentation 
Analysis". Journal of Behavioral Finance, Vol. 6, No. 1, (2005), pp. 6-14. 
Cohen, B. D., and Dean, T. J. "Information asymmetry and investor valuation of IPOs: Top 
management team legitimacy as a capital market signal". Strategic Management 
Journal, Vol. 26, No. 7, (2005), pp. 683-690. 
Corbetta, G., and Salvato, C. A. "The board of directors in family firms: one size fits all?". 
Family Business Review, Vol. 17, No. 2, (2004), pp. 119-134. 
Coval, J. D., and Shumway, T. "Do Behavioral Biases Affect Prices?". The Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 60, No. 1, (2005), pp. 1-34. 
Dempster, A. P., Laird, N. M., and Rubin, D. B. "Maximum likelihood from incomplete data 
via the EM algorithm". Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B 
(Methodological), Vol. 39, No. 1, (1977), pp. 1-38. 
Fan, J. P. H., and Wong, T. J. "Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of 
accounting earnings in East Asia". Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 33, 
No. 3, (2002), pp. 401-425. 
Fombrun, C., and Shanley, M. "What's in a Name? Reputation Building and Corporate 
Strategy". The Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 33, No. 2, (1990), pp. 233-258. 
Goranova, M., Alessandri, T. M., Brandes, P., and Dharwadkar, R. "Managerial ownership 
and corporate diversification: a longitudinal view". Strategic Management Journal, 
Vol. 28, No. 3, (2007), pp. 211-225. 
Hughes, P. J. "Signalling by direct disclosure under asymmetric information". Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, Vol. 8, No. 2, (1986), pp. 119-142. 
Jain, B. A., Jayaraman, N., and Kini, O. "The Path-to-profitability of Internet IPO firms". 
Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 23, No. 2, (2008), pp. 165-194. 
James, H. S. "Owner as manager, extended horizons and the family firm". International 
Journal of the Economics of Business, Vol. 6, No. 1, (1999), pp. 41-55. 
Jianakoplos, N. A., and Bernasek, A. "Are Women More Risk Averse?". Economic Inquiry, 
Vol. 36, No. 4, (1998), pp. 620-630. 
Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk". 
Econometrica, Vol. 47, No. 2, (1979), pp. 263-291. 
King, M. R., and Santor, E. "Family values: Ownership structure, performance and capital 
structure of Canadian firms". Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 32, No. 11, (2008), 
pp. 2423-2432. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A. "Corporate ownership around the world". 
The Journal of Finance, Vol. 54, No. 2, (1999), pp. 471-517. 
Lindstrom, M. J., and Bates, D. M. "Newton—Raphson and EM algorithms for linear mixed-
effects models for repeated-measures data". Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, Vol. 83, No. 404, (1988), pp. 1014-1022. 
Louviere, J. J., Hensher, D. A., and Swait, J. D. Stated Choice Methods: Analysis and 
Applications. Cambridge University Press, (2000). 
Maury, B. "Family ownership and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Western 
European corporations". Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 12, No. 2, (2006), pp. 
321-341. 
McFadden, D. "Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior" In  (1973). 
McGuire, J. B., Schneeweis, T., and Branch, B. "Perceptions of Firm Quality: A Cause or 
Result of Firm Performance". Journal of Management, Vol. 16, No. 1, (1990), pp. 
167-180. 
Michaely, R., and Vila, J.-L. "Investors' heterogeneity, prices, and volume around the ex-
dividend day". Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 30, No. 2, 
(1995), pp. 171-198. 




Miller, D., and Le Breton-Miller, I. Managing for the long run: Lessons in competitive 
advantage from great family businesses. Harvard Business Review, (2005). 
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. "Management ownership and market valuation: An 
empirical analysis". Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 20, No. 1, (1988), pp. 293-
315. 
Nagy, R. A., and Obenberger, R. W. "Factors influencing individual investor behavior". 
Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 50, No. 4, (1994), pp. 63-68. 
Noussair, C. N., and Tucker, S. "Experimental research on asset pricing". Journal of 
Economic Surveys, Vol. 27, No. 3, (2013), pp. 554-569. 
Prencipe, A., and Bar-Yosef, S. "Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in 
Family-Controlled Companies". Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, Vol. 26, 
No. 2, (2011), pp. 199-227. 
Prencipe, A., Markarian, G., and Pozza, L. "Earnings Management in Family Firms: 
Evidence From R&D Cost Capitalization in Italy". Family Business Review, Vol. 21, 
No. 1, (2008), pp. 71-88. 
Roger, A. M., and Suarez, A. F. "Risk Aversion Revisited". The Journal of Finance, Vol. 38, 
No. 4, (1983), pp. 1201-1216. 
Sanders, W., and Boivie, S. "Sorting things out: Valuation of new firms in uncertain 
markets". Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 25, No. 2, (2004), pp. 167-186. 
Schleifer, A., and Vishny, R. "A survey of corporate governance". Journal of Finance, Vol. 
52, No. 2, (1997), pp. 737-783. 
Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., Dino, R. N., and Buchholtz, A. K. "Agency relationships in 
family firms: Theory and evidence". Organization science, Vol. 12, No. 2, (2001), pp. 
99-116. 
Sraer, D., and Thesmar, D. "Performance and Behavior of Family Firms: Evidence From The 
French Stock Market". Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 5, No. 4, 
(2007), pp. 709-751. 
Sunder, S. "What have we learned from experimental finance?" In Developments on 
Experimental Economics. Berlin Heidelberg: Springer (2007). 
Villalonga, B., and Amit, R. "How do family ownership, control and management affect firm 
value?". Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 80, No. 2, (2006), pp. 385-417. 
Wang, D. "Founding Family Ownership and Earnings Quality". Journal of Accounting 
Research, Vol. 44, No. 3, (2006), pp. 619-656. 
Wang, J. "The term structure of interest rates in a pure exchange economy with 
heterogeneous investors". Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 41, No. 1, (1996), pp. 
75-110. 
Wood, R., and Zaichkowsky, J. L. "Attitudes and Trading Behavior of Stock Market 
Investors: A Segmentation Approach". Journal of Behavioral Finance, Vol. 5, No. 3, 
(2004), pp. 170-179. 
Yang, M.-L. "The impact of controlling families and family CEOs on earnings management". 
Family Business Review, Vol. 23, No. 3, (2010), pp. 266-279. 
 
  




Family Business Attitude Scale 
To what extent do you think family businesses typically exhibit these characteristics 









Quality of products or services ⃝⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
Innovativeness ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
Ability to attract, develop, and 
keep talented people 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
Responsibility to the community 
and the environment 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
Trustworthiness ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
Quality of management ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
Competitiveness ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
Profit-driven ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
Long-term investment value ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
Investment Horizon and Risk Tolerance Measures 
When purchasing stocks, what typical time period do you invest for?  
⃝ A few days 
⃝ A few months 
⃝ The next year 
⃝ The next few years 
⃝ The next 5 to 10 years 
⃝ Longer than 10 years 
Which of the following statements comes closest to the amount of financial risk that 
you are willing to take when you save or make investments? 
⃝ Take substantial financial risk expecting to earn substantial returns 
⃝ Take above average financial risks expecting to earn above average returns 
⃝ Take average financial risks expecting to earn average returns 
⃝ Not willing to take any financial risks 
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